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Acemoglu, Daron & James R. Robinson. Why Nations Fail: the origins of power,
prosperity and poverty. New York: Crown Publishing, 2012.
This fascinating best-seller combines numerous studies with a conceptual discussion
around the idea that some nations may reach development and its benefits while others fail in
that goal. Tracing a convincing argument, the contributing authors explain that two countries
formed by the same ethnicity, demography, and topography may reach different levels of
development, wealth, education, and heath. Understanding why this happens is the primary
attempt of the project. The authors assert that when political power is concentrated in few
hands, the wealth is not distributed to the rest of society, creating poverty. In view of this,
non-democratic societies are prone to perpetuate narrowly-formed elites since governments
are not removed by elections. The text’s main thesis is aimed at critiquing democracy (in the
US and Europe) with respect not only to how governments address the claims of their
respective citizens but also to the cultural conditions and issues that contributed to the
development of democracy in different places:
“Why are the institutions of the United States so much more conducive to economic
success than those of Mexico or, for that matter, the rest of Latin America? The
answer to this question lies in the ways the different societies formed during the early
colonial period. An institutional divergence took place [at that time], with
implications lasting into the present day. To understand this divergence, we must
begin right at the foundation of the colonies in North and Latin America”. (p 9)
In Latin America, the Spanish settlers set about stripping the indigenous leaders of
their authority, and once done, Spanish efforts were aimed at creating a new elite, which
obliged the native populations to pay taxes and other tributes. The Spanish conquest in the
Americas was based on the idea that others should work for the Spanish crown. This
founding principle forever marked the destiny of Latin America. Unlike those in the Angloworld, Latin American elites organized the exploitation of indigenous peoples from a
perspective of “monopoly of wealth,” to which they expected their colonized subjects would
contribute. The British Empire, in contrast, when it arrived to the Americas, not only found
no gold or other precious metals—which existed in territories that were already occupied by
the Spaniards—but also had to survive via labor and trade with indigenous populations—as
opposed to simply acquiring the wealth of indigenous leaders . Labor and trade with others
played a vital role in configuring the political system of North America. The culture of
exploitation was “unknown” in US and Canada, claim the authors—though this assertion
virtually erases any trace of the exploitation done to Native North Americans by European
colonizers—thereby facilitating the rapid adoption of democracy as the first form of
governance. While the Latin American region included a high density population that
facilitated exploitation by Iberian Empires, in North America, the British crown had problems
incorporating the same institutions used by Spain and Portugal. Say the contributing authors
of this text, this generated a system of incentive in North American in which hard-work and
egalitarian rights paved the way for the formation of democracy.
The work is centered on a historical approach that attempts to unravel the puzzle of
poverty. In the second chapter, the authors explore how poor countries find themselves in
such situations not as a result their cultures or geographies but rather by their governments.
The authors assert that politics induce societies to follow certain incentives while others are
discarded, which explains how prosperity and poverty surface. Chapters 4 and 5 examine the
historical evolution of empires as well as the problems faced by currently expanding nations
(such as China) looking to maintain their rates of growth. The problem of development and
loans are addressed in chapters 7 through 9. The remaining chapters are dedicated to offering
a model based on democracy as a political template. The contributing authors claim that the
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failure of nations to achieve democracy is determined by a “logic of exploitation,” leading to
“absolutism.” This exploitation results in an atmosphere of non-participation among ordinary
citizens, they say, who feel detached and disempowered, engendering dictatorial institutions,
which are not prepared to successfully manage the economy. Acemoglu and Robinson argue
convincingly that prosperity and wealth cannot be engineered or designed by means of
rational policies introduced by experts whenever the culture is built upon an authoritarian
foundation. In contrast, prosperity and wealth, they say, are the results of deliberative
democracies worldwide.
Although this book offers an all-encompassing view on the convergence of politics
and economy, giving readers a fresh theoretical framework, it rests on a shaky foundation,
namely, ethnocentrism (or what this reviewer calls “Anglo-centrism”). An ethnocentric
perspective is one that is characterized not only by the valorization of one’s own ethnic or
cultural values or viewpoints as universally applicable but also the implication that such
values or viewpoints are superior to any others. Simply put, an ethnocentric reality (as
described by Professor Rudolf Rocker when describing the United States) is a great fallacy.
The United States from its inception has contained within it both liberal and authoritarian
tendencies (the latter typically being a reactionary or fear-based attempt to keep particular
social or ethnic groups from enjoying the same liberties as the ethnic—White—majority). An
example of this is the history of the enslavement of African Americans and the subsequent
struggle of African Americans, upon the abolition of slavery, to gain the right to vote and
dismantle legal segregation; Michael Omi and Howard Winant assert that the segregation of
the African American population in the U.S. served to create a racialized state, within which
an African American “Other” was excluded from economic progress.
Not only does the U.S. have a dubious history with respect to its own record
upholding democratic ideals, democracy itself (particularly Anglo-democracy) may not be
the development “cure all” that the authors claim it to be. M. Korstanje has questioned the
very concept behind “Anglo-democracy,” when compared to the ancient Greek democracy.
In ancient Greece, elections and voting were unknown, at least in the classic sense.
Additionally, in ancient Greece, not only was slavery a valid means of providing labor, but it
was also the decree of the king that slavery exist. As a last resort, the opinions of the
people—the demos—were only considered when the citizens felt the passing of a particular
law to be unjust. In an egalitarian arrangement within the ancient Greek monarchy, any Greek
citizen was able to ask the Senate to strike down a law if the law threatened the public
domain. We must acknowledge that in modern (Anglo) democracy, similar limitations have
been placed on the rights or authority of citizens. The British Empire reformulated a new
meaning of ancient democracy, more associated to trade, freedom, private property and selfdetermination of peoples. It received the name of Anglo-democracy. To some extent, this
way of idealizing democracy was adopted by the US. Within Anglo democracy, for example,
not only is a president not elected by a simple direct majority, but there is also a functional
barrier between professional politicians and the society that they represent. Governments are
formed by the indirect participation of their citizenships, creating a gap which is then filled
by the financial contributions of major business corporations and industries, which support
political campaigns. Ultimately, the “freedom” espoused by Anglo democracy is a temporary
state of liberty that only is granted to the ordinary citizen in order that he may consume the
produced commodities of late-capitalism (Korstanje, 2013). Indeed, democracy is not the
panacea that the Anglo-centric West would have the world believe it to be, nor is Western
democracy as truly “democratic” as it purports to be.
Quite aside from this, one of the aspects that leads Acemoglu and Robinson to trouble
is their argument about why nations fail, which is, at its heart, based on a fundamental
misconception. Their very folly validates an error of interpretation, in which the behaviors of
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others are interpreted and assessed through the lens of the group to which the individuals
doing the assessing belong. This means that democracy and prosperity are themselves social
constructs, only valid in capitalist societies; they are not universal ideals by themselves. The
correlation between them is taken as a given in societies in which they already co-exist,
where there is no simultaneous serious discussion of how democracy has evolved (neither
with respect to its possible diverse interpretations or the differences it may display over time).
What the authors fundamentally fail to recognize is that there are many other nations that are
free to choose to live in another way; there is no imperative stating that all nations should be
democratic in order to enjoy the “benefits” of modern life and a capitalist economy. Indeed,
paradoxically, envisaging democracy as a “universal value” is a betrayal to the self
determination of others (the very cornerstone of democracy itself).
To put it bluntly, this book falls in an ecological fallacy that places the horse before
the cart. If we think that values such as prosperity, longer life spans, access to voting, and
good health are good for all peoples, we must assume the rest of world should also seek them
(via the same routes we used to achieve them). However, other non-western cultures may see
in the West serious pathologies accelerated by Anglo democracy, such as insomnia,
emotional distress, suicide, crime, job insecurity, sexual abuse, and drug abuse. This book
ignores precisely what anthropology showed us one century ago: the observer sees what he
believes he sees; in the case of the examination of democracy in this text, this means that the
economic factors resulting from the development of Anglo-democracy suggest that Western
democracy and its spirit resulted from the evolution of superior “values” over others the
values of others of “weaker character.” The current discourse of rationality, embodied in the
theory of development indeed poses one of the world’s more radical crises (Rajan, 2010;
Stiglitz, 2003). By defining a nation’s success as a function of its degree of wealth or per
capita income (as this book does), corresponds directly to an “ethnocentric” mechanism
within the discipline, aimed at creating a need in non-Western societies, namely, the “need”
to be “developed” and “modern.” Last, the ultimate weakness of the text is its failure to
expand the discussion of development beyond the West. The text also never opened the
discussion of the responsibility of international banks or financial organizations such as IMF
or World Bank, which, according to analysts and academicians who delve into cultural
pathologies, have contributed to the miring of third world countries in civil-war, corruption,
and ethnic cleansing (Esteva & Prakash, 1998). Philosophically speaking, these very issues
mirror the problem the West has of understanding “otherness”; indeed, according to this
approach, “difference” is necessarily conceptualized as a glitch in need of fixing, as opposed
to a legitimate and fundamental distinction in character belonging to other collective beings.
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